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In this paper I develop a heterodox economics account of ho'W individuals influence institutions and social values. In contemporary economics there are t'Wo opposed 'Ways of characterizing this influence. Mainstream economics treats institutions and social values as the products of atomistic individual activity, meaning that 'When individuals act, they act free of any significant social attachments. In contrast, heterodox economics treats institutions and social values as the product of socially embedded individual activity, meaning that 'When individuals act, they act socially or as members of various kinds of groups. The atomistic vie'W has dominated economics for a half century or more. Thus, to make sense of this difference from a heterodox perspective, 'We need to sho'W ho'W individuals in groups act differently from groups of atomistic individuals, or ho'W individuals acting in an organized 'Way behave differently from unorganized collections of individuals. I understand the difference to be essentially a matter of explaining ho'W individuals acting in groups have "shared" intentions about the groups of 'Which they are members.
This distinction bet'Ween "shared" intentions and ordinary individual intentions may seem relatively straightforvvard in everyday language, since people use "'We" language in an intentional manner 'When they focus on their membership in groups ("'What 'We 'Want," "'What our department decided," "'What the community has chosen to do," etc.), and use "I" language 'When they see themselves as acting independently of others (u'What I 'Want," "'What I believe," etc.). Yet, until recently the philosophical explanation of intentionality has been almost entirely associated 'With the explanation of individual intentions associated 'With the use of "I" language. Moreover. proponents of individualist explanations in the social sciences and especially in economics argue that it makes no sense to ascribe intentions to groups of individuals, because only individuals can have intentions. For them, our ordinary 'Ways of speaking are at best an ill-founded expedient, and a proper analysis of "'We" language should reduce such expressions to sets of "I" expressions.
Here, Illy strategy is to develop an account of "shared" intention that ans"Wers these objections by dra"Wing on a Illore recent philosophical literature on the subject of collective intentionality. In this literature, "When "We speak of individuals as being socially eIllbedded, "We Inean that they have we-intentions, that is, intentions that they attribute -and believe that others attribute -to the group of "Which they are IlleIllbers. Though these "We-intentions are often said to be "shared" in this literature, caution needs to be sho"Wn in using this terIll. Collective intentionality analysis is non-holistic, Ineaning that only individuals have intentions, not groups. Individuals attribute intentions to the groups of "Which they are IlleInbers, and participate in this attribution by using ""We" language. In this sense "We-intentions are shared. But this does not iIllply that a group has an intention over and above the intentions of the individuals that Illake it up. We-intentions are individually expressed intentions, though of a special kind in Illaking the group rather than the individual their subject. In "What follo"Ws, then, only individuals exist in regard to intentional expression. The issue then beCOIlles "Whether the relationships bet"Ween individuals expressing "We-intentions are cOInpatible "With characterizing individuals atoInistically, or "Whether individuals' use of ""We" language requires that "We characterize individuals as being socially eInbedded.
This issue, ho"Wever, cannot be kept separate froIn another. As I "Will argue, the Inost iInportant consequence of treating individuals as being socially eIllbedded in groups is that their behavior can no longer be explained solely in instruInentally rational tenllS. That is, "When individuals are seen to be socially eInbedded in groups, the requireInents upon theIn as IlleInbers of those groups dictate that their behavior be explained as "What I label a deontologically rational behavior or as "principled" rational behavior. Thus, if a collective intentionality analysis of individuals' use of ""We" language iInplies that individuals cannot be conceived of atoIllistically, but IllUSt be thought to be socially embedded in groups, then it also implies that their behavior needs to be reconceptualized as "Well, "With instrumental rationality taking a back seat to a deontologically rational or "principled" rational type of behavior.
In this chapter, I thus address the question of ho"W individuals influence institutions and social values in terInS of a conception of the individual as socially eInbedded, explaining this conception in terInS of "We-intentions, and dra"Wing out the iInplications all this has for ho"W"We understand individual behavior. Section 1 introduces the concept of collective intentionality, relying on the thinking of the leading contributor to the subject, Finnish philosopher, RaiIno TuoIllela. Section 2 applies the collective intentionality concept to the agency-structure Inodel as dra"Wn froIn Tony La" Wson (1997) to explain ho"W individuals socially embedded in groups can be thought to influence institutions and social values through their ability to forIn "We-intentions. Section 3 addresses ho"W our understanding of individual econoITlic behavior needs to be revised to include deontologically or "principled" rational behavior vvhen vve consider the socially eITlbedded individuaL Section 4 briefly COITlITlents on individuals' capacity to fonn vve-intentions in terITlS of the idea of seeing things froITl others' points of vievv, and then sUITlITlarizes the arguITlent of the paper.
Collective intentionality and individuals' influence on institutions and social values
Until recently, analytic philosophers have explained the concept of intentionality -the idea that ITlental states have an "aboutness" to themin terITlS of the actions and intentions of individuals (e.g. Anscombe 1963; Davidson 1980) .1 Having an intention involves settling on a course of action, either by deciding to act in some vvay or even by simply excluding considerations that favor alternative courses of action. Having an intention involves forming a cOITlITlitment to action, and intentional action only occurs vvhen an agent aiITls to bring sOITlething about by acting in a purposive vvay. But if a collection of individuals perforITls some set of actions as a group or teaITl, and each individual acts intentionally, does this mean that the group acts intentionally as vvell, settling on a group course of action and making a comITlitment to action as a group? In the atoITlist tradition, individuals form intentions and act, groups do not. Individuals may act as meITlbers of groups, but they still fonn their intentions individually, because only individual ITlinds exist. Thus Hayek held that supra-individual entities such as groups, classes, etc. should be thought of as theoretical concepts rather than real things (e.g. Hayek 1955) , and Arrovv's assertion that "society" "is just a convenient label for the totality of individuals" (Arrovv 1984: 80) . FroITl their perspective, because all intentionality is individual, collective intentionality ITlust be a theoretical concept rather than a really existing thing. The alternative is to iITlagine SOITle fanciful sort of Hegelian super-mind floating above and about individual ITlinds. Yet, the dileITlma this poses is a false one. We can say that all ITlentallife occurs vvithin individual minds, but this does not iITlply that all intentions are individual and must be expressed in first person singular terITls. It is not incoherent for an individual to refer to a group of vvhich that individual is a meITlber, and say, "vve intend," or to use first person plural expressions in a variety of circumstances to indicate vvhat a group's intentions might be. Nor does the use of "vve-intentions" presuppose the existence of any sort of super-ITlind or other "type of supraindividual entity. Indeed, since "vve-intentions" language is as common in everyday life as "I intentions" language, there is every reason to investigate the implications of collective intentionality for econoITlic behavior.
In the current philosophical literature on the subject, collective intentionality and vve-intentions are explained as a structure of reciprocal i; r j I attitudes shared by individuals. The ITluin contributions ITluy be found in BratITlan (1993; , Gilbert (1989) , Searle (1990; , TuoITlela and Miller (1988) and TuoITlela (1991; . In the discussion that follo"\",'5 I rely on TuoITlela's "\Vork, "\Vhich is the ITlost extensive and "\VeIl-developed. TuoITlela's analysis is conservative, in that though it sOITletiITles ITlakes reference to intentions as being shared, this is not ITleant to iITlply that there is any actual sharing of intentions, beliefs, desires, or other "\Ve-intentions by individuals using "we" language. Rather, a we-intention is an individual's attribution of an intention to a group that the individual believes is reciprocally held by other individuals in that saITle group. Indeed, an individual may have a "\Ve-intention that no other individuals actually have if that individual is mistaken about others having that "\Ve-intention. Thus, a we-intention is not a supra-individual group intention separate frOITl the attributions of individuals. Rather, a "\Ve-intention is an individual's expression of a group intention based on a sense of there being like attributions on the part of others in the group to which the individual belongs. Thus, the expression "the intentions of the group" is really shorthand for a set of individual "\Ve-intentions on the part of a collection of individuals in the group.
T"\Vo characteristics of we-intentions are accordingly emphasized in TuoITlela's analysis. First, the individual expressing a "\Ve-intention believes that this intention is widely if not universally held by other group meITlbers, and secondly, the individual believes this intention is mutually held by meITlbers of the group. (In the limiting case above both of these beliefs are mistaken.) Consider the case in "\Vhich an individual's we-intention is rooted in an attitude ("fear") that the individual believes group ITleITlbers also attribute to the group. For an individual A who is a meITlber of a group G, "A "\Ve-fears that X if A fears that X and believes that it is feared in G that X and that it is mutually believed in G that X is feared in G" (Tuomela 1995: 38) . On this basis A might suppose that G has SOITle intention reflecting the fear of X. This "\Ve-intention "\Vould have the saITle structure as the attitude A ascribes to the group. Of course, A can only surITlise that others in G have the saITle fear and that the fear of X is ITlutually believed by ITleITlbers of the group. Ideally, the idea that X is "ITlutually believed" "\Vould involve saying that the fear that X is believed by everyone, but TuoInela allo"\Vs that "mutual" can have strong and "\Veak interpretations, because groups theInselves have strong and weak criteria for supposing their ITleITlbers share a belief, attitude, or intention. The main point is that "\Ve-attitudes are a group attitude, not in the sense that a group apart froIn its ITleITlbers has an attitude to"\Vards something, but in the sense that individuals "generally" in a group have SOITle such attitude expressible in ""\Ve" terITls. Thus, saying that they "generally" have a "\Ve-attitude depends not just on the ITlutual belief condition, but on both conditions, "\Vhich if cOITlbined, provide us "\Vith reason to suppose that individual members of a group are justified in saying "\-Vhat they (n"\-Ve N ) intend. 2 Note that this very basic understanding of collective intentionality already takes us some "\-Vay to"\-Vards understanding ho"\-V individuals can be thought to influence institutions and social values. From an atomist point of vie"\-V, the main difficulty in understanding ho"\-V individual behavior influences institutions and social values lies in sho"\-Ving ho"\-V some-: thing fundamentally individual in nature gets translated into something that is fundamentally social in nature. Thus, game theory accounts that attempt to explain ho"\-V social conventions and institutions emerge from the choices of atomistic individuals are either forced to rely on ad hoc assumptions not explainable in terms of individual choice to get the job done, or they simply fail to get the job done (cf. Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 1995; Rizvi 1994) . In contrast, "\-Vhen"\-Ve suppose that individuals are socially embedded in groups and form "\-Ve-intentions about those groups' activities, "\-Ve have already assumed that individuals are engaged in social activity_ Institutions and social values are products of social activity. What Tuomela's analysis adds to this basic idea is an explanation of social activity in terms of structures of reciprocally related "\-Ve-intentions possessing a mutually reinforcing character. These structures of interaction, as it "\-Vere, function as the skeletons of social activity and therefore of the institutions and social values that are the products of social activity. Thus, change and evolution in structures of "\-Ve-intentions in groups bring about change and evolution in institutions and social values, and individuals influence institutions and social values as they continually form ne"\-V and different "\-Ve-intentions about the groups of "\-Vhich they are members.
Tuomela's analysis also provides a basis for distinguishing ho"\-V individuals influence institutions as compared to ho"\-V they influence social values. Using his distinction bet"\-Veen rules and norms, "\-Ve-attitudes and "\-Ve-intentions associated "\-Vith rules underlie institutions, and "\-Ve-attitudes associated "\-Vith norms underlie social values. With rules, an explicit or implicit agreement brought into existence by some authority determines a distribution of tasks and activities to individuals. Rules rrtay be formal and "\-Vritten, such as la"\-Vs, statutes, regulations, charters, by-Ia"\-Vs, etc., or they may be informal agreements bet"\-Veen individuals, sometillles orally established and sOllletillles silently agreed to. With norlllS, lllutual beliefs substitute for actual agreelllents bet"\-Veen individuals in deterlllining distributions of tasks and activities across individuals. As "\-Vith "\-Ve-intentions generally, mutual beliefs are beliefs reciprocally established behveen individuals, such that each believes that others have the sallle belief, and each also believes that others think the sallle about the others, and so on in a structure of reinforcing, mutually held beliefs.
Rules and norms are both understood to have lllotivational force, meaning that they constitute reasons for action on the part of the individuals who accept them. Indeed, rules and norms are typically framed as "ought" principles, and impose requirements on individuals as members of groups in the form of specific prescriptions for individual action. Formally, individual A feels obliged to do X, because A is a member of the group with a we-intention representable in terms of a rule or norm to the effect, "-w-e believe members of the group should do X." But rules and norms are different in virtue of the different means by -w-hich they enforce a distribution of tasks and activities among individuals (Tuomela 1995: 22-24) . The prescriptive force of rules derives from there being sanctions that apply, -w-hether formal/legal or informal, to those individuals -w-ho do not observe them. In contrast to rules, sanctioning -w-ith norms takes the form of approval or disapproval on the part of others. Because norms are internalized by individuals in that they themselves accept them as reasons for acting, individuals apply others' potential disapproval to themselves, as -w-hen feeling shame or embarrassment.
In Tuomela's collective intentionality analysis, then, rules are the basis for institutions, and norms are the basis for social values. While it is true that many institutions also involve norms, as relatively settled social arrangements institutions generally place greater reliance on rules. Social values, in contrast, are rarely rooted in agreements, even informally, and thus place little -w-eight on rules. Rather, social values reflect systems of mutual belief about individuals' interaction -w-ith one another. Thus, -w-hen individuals create and/ or change institutions, they adopt ne-w-rules, and produce new -w-e-attitudes that define group action -w-ithin an institutional frame-w-ork characterizable in terms of agreements and corresponding sanctions. When individuals develop and/ or influence social values, they adopt new norms, and produce ne-w--w-e-attitudes that define group action within a social value frame-w-ork based on their mutual beliefs and systems of (dis)approvaL In both fraUle-w-orks, rules/ institutions and norms/ social values, we-intentions are the foundation for understanding group action. Individuals thus influence institutions and social values as members of groups, and group action is the interUlediate link bet-w-een individual action and supra-individual institutions and social values Ulissing froUl mainstream. accounts of individuals' influence on institutions and social values.
To complete this picture, -w-e need to briefly consider ho-w-rules and norms create obligations for individuals in terms of ho-w-different tasks, rights, and positions apply to different individuals in groups. Tuomela characterizes an individual's position within a particular group in terms of that individual's tasks and rights -w-ithin that group. An individual's tasks and rights are then further distinguished according to -w-hether they flo-wfrom rules or norUlS operating -w-ithin the group, that is, -w-hether they are rule-based tasks and rights or norm-based tasks and rights. Across groups, individuals' social positions are understood in terms of the -w-hole array of actions individuals are required and permitted to do across various economic settings. These social positions assign individuals a variety of different tasks vvhose performance is, in each instance, protected by rights, vvhere these tasks-rights combinations may themselves exist vvithin established modes of implementation that are also understood in tasks-rights terms. The overall framevvork thus explains individual rights and duties vvithin and across groups in terms of tasks-rights pairs that ultimately have vve-attitudes in groups as their foundation. Individuals influence institutions and social values by acting vvithin this framevvork.
2. The agency-structure Illodel -w-ith collective intentionality I focus on the agency-structure model, first, because it describes human agency as an °embedded intentional causality" and human rationality as a situated rationality (Lavvson 1997: 63, 187) , and, second, because it describes not only hovv individuals are influenced by institutions and social values, but also hovv they influence institutions and social values. A precursory formulation of the model is Anthony Giddens' influential "structuration theory," vvhich treats individuals and social structures as interdependent, or as a duality, such that each may be said to help constitute the other, especially through recurrent social practices (1976; 1984) . Roy Bhaskar (1979 Bhaskar ( [1989 ) and Margaret Archer (1995) revised and extended Giddens' thinking, principally by seeing reality as stratified and multi-layered vvith emergent properties differentiating one layer or level frolTI another (cf. Hodgson 2000: 5-13; also Collier 1994) . Lavvson developed this latter, critical realist conception of the agency-structure relationship specifically for economics in Part III of his Economics and Reality (1997) , and used it primarily to critique the rnethodological posture of mainstream economics. An important aspect of Lavvson's analysis is that individuals engage in routinized forms of activity, rely on tacit knovvledge and skills, and observe rules, norrns and conventions. What, then, does the concept of collective or group intentionality add to this account?
In the first place, the concept of collective intentionality permits us to develop a more concrete understanding of individuals' ernbeddedness and situated rationality in terms of the vvays in vvhich groups of individuals are organized. Groups, in virtue of their complexity, are organized so as to assign povver and responsibility differently to individuals in different positions, yet, in virtue of their having "shared" intentions, still in a manner that airns at consistency in overall action across these assignITlents. Focusing on individuals' involveITlent in groups allovvs us to explain vvhy individuals engage in particular types of routinized activity, vvhat particular tacit knovvledge and skills they need to rely upon, and vvhat particular rules, norITlS, and conventions they need to observe based on the vvay that the group as a vvhole organizes a set of positions in a , I relatively coherent structure. Simply referring to individuals' reliance on routines, tacit abilities, and so forth fails to account for vvhy different individuals act in different vvays, and therefore, ultimately, hovv changes in the vvays that individuals act in concert vvith one another influences institutions and social values. Individuals act in the vvays that they do, because they occupy particular positions in groups organized in terms of collections of positions (cf. Lavvson 1997: 163 ff).
But more is involved than simply adding nevv detail to our analysis of individual embeddedness and to the account of the influence of individuals on institutions and social values. When individuals act under rationales involving vve-intentions, groups become agents over and above the collection of individuals that make them up. Individuals' actions still have effects, but specifically as a particular pattern of effects that can be identified as the effects that the group has as a distinguishable agent in its ovvn right. Tuomela's account of collective intentionality, in explaining collective intentionality and "shared" intention as a structure of individual intentions, at once combines the causal effectivity of individual action vvith the fact of individuals' organization in groups to justify treating groups as cohesive, single agents. Thus the fact that individuals follovv routines, adopt norms, etc. is not just evidence that human agency involves an "embedded intentional causality" and a situated rationality, but it is evidence that individuals influence institutions and social values by vvay of the group structures in vvhich individuals are embedded.
But one point needs clarification. We savv above that mainstream economics lacks an account of hovv groups mediate betvveen individuals and institutions and social values, and that this tends to produce a reliance on ad hoc assumptions in efforts to explain hovv individuals influence institutions and social values. Given that such explanations enjoy limited success at best, it does not corne as a surprise that the language of "unintended consequences" strongly underlies 'mainstream economics' accounts of the relation of individuals to institutions and social values. But this reliance should not be thought to imply that, vvhen vve turn to collective intentionality analysis of groups, that institutions and social values are fully intended consequences of the activities of individuals in groups. In the first place, in the agency-structure lllodel, structure, or institutions and social values also influence individuals (just as they are influenced by individuals), and this causal process lllakes the evolution and development of institutions and social values an open-ended process vvith unintended consequences. But there are other reasons specific to the operation of groups vvhich lead us to the sallle conclusion. First, the nUlllber and variety of kinds of groups vvhich exist in human society is truly staggering, ranging from lllore tightly organized groups such as firllls, governments, and households (March and Simon 1956) to more loosely formed ones such as social movements or even just tvvo individuals "going for a vvalk together" (Gilbert 1989). Indeed, if vve add to groups in this ITlore "objective" rule-governed sense all those collections of individuals vvho constitute groups in the ITlore "subjective" sense of adhering to shared social values, then the nUITlber of groups is even larger. Second, ITleITlbership in and across groups is obviously cross-cutting, overlapping, and often conflicting. Add to this the fact that meITlbership in groups is continually changing, and vve have further reason to expect considerable "unintended consequences" in our analysis. Third, groups hovvever defined, do not make up the entire universe of economic agents. Individual action that is relatively autonomous (if not atomistic) also contributes to the evolution of institutions and social values. For these reasons, the activity of groups of individuals ought only be said to influence rather than fully explain or deterITline the evolution of institutions and social values.
What general methodological strategy does the collective intentionality account of individuals as socially embedded thus add to the agencystructure rnodel? First, vve begin by surveying and identifying particular groups of individuals acting as econornic agents, vvhere the selection of those groups that are of interest to us is driven by our current causeand-effect concerns presented to us in the form of "vvhy" questions regarding the vvay things happen in the econornic vvorld (Runde 1998) . Second, our characterization of these groups involves our explaining their position-task-right structures, vvhich accounts for their internal organization and their capacity to coherently organize the different activities of different individuals. Third, vve atternpt to explain interaction betvveen groups, vvhere this involves institutions or social values vvith acrossgroup rules and norms. This broader fraITlevvork is no less a domain of collective intentionality, though it stretches the idea of a group to think of institutions and social values being groups. and norms, vve savv, function as "ought" principles or social requirements, and as such generally lead socially embedded individuals to behave in vv-ays different from the vvays that atomistic individuals behave. It is this emphasis on "ought" principles and the social requirements of group membership, then, that is at odds vv-ith explaining the behavior of socially embedded individuals in instrumentally rational terms, and suggests that socially embedded individuals are fundamentally different from atomistic individuals.
Those vv-ho defend the atomistic conception of the individual and instrumental rationality vvould likely first reject these arguments for the follovving reason. Explaining individual behavior in terms of group requirements is ultimately equivalent to explaining individual behavior as instrumentally rational though novv subject to constraints additional to those usually assumed in standard constrained 'optimization analysis, namely;. constraints associated vvith observing the rules and norms of group membership. These additional "social" constraints further narrovv individuals' choice sets, but individuals still ought to be thought to maximize their preferences vvithin this additionally delimited space. Even socially embedded individuals, that is, ultirnately behave in an instrumentally rational fashion, and it thus follovvs that socially embedded individuals are not different in any substantive sense from atomistic individuals.
This response, hovvever, overlooks vv-hat is different about individual behavior in groups in vvhich individuals express vve-intentions. On the understanding developed by Tuomela and others, since vve-intentions are the intentions of individuals and not the intentions of groups, vv-hatever these intentions irnply in the vvay of individual behavior -say, that one ought to observe group rules and norms -must be thought of as having been intended by the individuals vvho have them. That is, intentional behavior, vv-hatever its nature, reflects vvhat the individual chooses to do, not vvhat the individual is limited to doing. In the language of mainstream rationality theory;. vve-intentions derive from individuals' objective functions no less than do those individual intentions standard theory vvould associate vvith individuals acting on ovvn preferences. Thus, acting in accordance vvith rules and norms is not evidence of acting under an additional set of constraints ("social" constraints). And since rules and norms impose requirements on individuals, supposing vve-intentions derive from socially embedded individuals' objective functions, it gives us good reason to think individual behavior cannot be explained in instrumentally rational terms.
But might not defenders of the atomistic conception of the individual and instrumental rationality use this reply for one further defense of the standard conception? If vve-intentions enter individuals' objective function, they might argue, then they must be produced by vve-preferences, just as ordinary individual intentions are produced by ovvn preferences (or I-preferences) . If this is so, thus tnight not the behavior of socially ell1.bedded individuals still be explained in instrutnentally rational terITls? Indeed w-e-preferences have recently been analyzed along these lines by Robert Sugden in the fortn of teall1. preferences (Sugden 2000) . Sugden explicitly rejects collective intentionality analysis as carried out by TuoITlela and others, precisely because it introduces the idea that individuals are bound by social obligations (or group requireITlents) w-hich he regards as being inconsistent w-ith an account of instruInentally rational behavior. To preserve the latter, then, the forIner has to go. This, in turn, w-ould itnply that rules and norInS are things teaITlS prefer to observe rather than believe their ITleInbers are cOITlpelled to observe. Moreover, if this is all true, then it is hard to see w-hy, w-ith a teaITl preferences analysis of rules and norInS, individuals should be treated as socially etnbedded. If their w-e-intentions derive froITl w-e-preferences, and consequently itnpose no obligations or requiretnents upon theITl, it seeInS that their relationship to others is incidental to their behavior. Indeed, Sudgen effectively takes this position w-hen he argues that the "existence" question regarding w-hether teatns and other groups exist is independent of the theory of (instruITlental) rationality enlarged to include w-e-preferences. In the final analysis, Sugden's view-is that the conception of the individual as an atoITlistic being is sufficient for any discussion of w-e-preferences, w-e-intentions, and action in accord w-ith rules and norITls.
Clearly, Sugden's analysis turns on the idea that w-e-preferences do not iITlpose "ought" principles or social requireITlents upon individuals. Why is it, then, that Tuoll1.ela and other proponents of collective intentionality see this as an essential diITlension of w-e-intentions? The answ-er lies in their specific understanding of w-e-intentions. Individual w-e-intentions are w-hat individuals think are the intentions of individuals in a group generally. They are not w-hat individuals think ought to be the intentions of the group, nor are they the intentions of the group from any individual's ow-n particular point of view-. Since successfully expressing w-eintentions requires that an individual believe that other individuals have that saIne w-e-intention and also believe that this w-e-intention is tnutually believed, an individual's expression of a w-e-intention basically involves the individual's best guess regarding a structure of intentions on the part of different individuals regarding w-hat they all think everyone else believes is the intention of the group. But this ITleans that there is a tension of SOIne kind w-ithin the individual betw-een this best guess view-and w-hatever ITlight be this individual's ow-n view-of w-hat the group intends. This tension is a product of the fact that one does not use "w-e" language properly unless one ll1.akes a best effort to get at w-hat everyone else means in using "w-e." In effect, an individual using "w-e" language ITlust Inake a cOInInitment to a group's view-of its intentions irrespective of w-hether the individual personally agrees about this use of "'w-e." For this i :
reason, using ""\Ve" language and expressing "\Ve-intentions in the collective intentionality sense imposes obligations on individuals associated "\Vith standing by "\Vhatever the group's intention involves. Moreover, an obligation in this sense is not just something that binds an individual, but also a binding that the individual embraces. One only feels a genuine obligation, that is, "\Vhen one has embraced that obligation oneself.
Sugden's treatment of "\Ve-preferences as preferences of instrumentally rational atomistic individuals consequently does not really get at "\Vhat is involved in "\Ve-intentions. We-intentions do not derive from "\Ve-preferences, but rather from individual commitment to a use of ""\Ve" language that (self-) imposes obligations on the individual. But atomistic individuals do not act out of any such sense of obligation but only on the basis of "\Vhat they prefer. Moreover, in Sugden's "\Ve-preference analysis, the individual's relation to others is an incidental one. We-preferences are held in essentially the same "\Vay by all team members, and there is no difference bet"\Veen the "\Vay "\Ve-preferences properly represent the team and the "\Vay an individual might understand the team's "\Ve-preferences. In contrast, "\Ve-intentions require the individual's commitment to the use of a shared "\Ve-Ianguage that goes beyond individual perspective. This, and the obligation it brings, socially embeds the individual in the group, and brings about a non-incidental relationship bet"\Veen the individual and others.
As said above, acting out of a sense of obligation or the requirements upon oneself may be characterized as being deontologically rational rather than instrumentally rational. Philosophers have traditionally seen the difference as being a matter of doing "\Vhat one thinks one ought to do as opposed to doing "\Vhat one "\Vants to do. This may "\VeIl suggest that vvhat is meant here is that being deontologically rational is equivalent to acting morally, and that, therefore, the behavior of SOcially embedded individuals needs to be explained in terms of the categories of ethics. It is true that philosophers of ethics have used the term "deontology" to refer to a particular (non-consequentialist) approach to moral behavior. But clearly, many, if not most, of the obligations and requirements that groups impose upon individuals have little to do "\Vith acting morally. The term "ought," of course, is also used in a non-normative, pragmatic sense. It is this sense of the term that I generally mean to refer to vvhen I characterize socially embedded individuals as acting in a deontologically rational "\Vay. Indeed, the second expression used above to characterize acting out of a sense of obligation or in terms of group requirementsacting in a "principled" rational "\Vay -is probably the better one to employ. Individual action in groups is guided by a variety of principles, vvhose observance can be thought rational in a broad sense. For example, accepting the tasks assigned to one in an agreed-upon division of labor "\Vould be thought by most people to involve acting on a rational principle. Nor vvould it be said that a principle of this nature has any special moral content. Such principles simply constitute "Working principles in the operation of many groups. I thus characterize their observation by individuals as a "principled" type of rational behavior, and leave it to another occasion to investigate the extent to "Which such behavior also raises questions of ITlorality.
My general argument, it should also be emphasized, is not that socially embedded individuals behave only in a "principled" rational fashion. Individuals "Who express "We-intentions and are members of groups clearly also have their o"Wn preferences, and may seek to realize them in an instrumentally rational manner, either "When they find themselves at odds "With "What is expected of them in groups, or even "When they see themselves as acting in conformity "With "\.Yhat the group expects of them. Indeed, in the organization of many groups, individuals are expected to act in an instruInentally rational "Way in order to best fulfill the requirements of group IneInbership. Consider an employee in a business assigned a set of rule and norIn-based tasks associated "With doing a particular job. If one rule is to invoice customers by the end of the Inonth, and the norIn for ho"\.Y this is to be done is to include in the invoice a complete description of all purchases made by those customers, the individual assigned these tasks is likely still free to perform them in a variety of "Ways (inquire as to customer satisfaction, pursue follo"W-up orders, institute ne"W record-keeping practices, etc.). Ho"W "Well individuals do their assigned jobs, then, can be a Inatter of the extent to "Which they also act on their o"\.Yn preferences regarding the "\.Yay a job is best done. They consequently act in an instrumentally rational "\.Yay "When already behaving in a "principled" rational manner.
Individuals, it thus seeInS fair to say, engage in both instrumentally rational and "principled" rational kinds of behavior, and that the balance or mix of these depends upon the circumstances and the setting. Abstractly, one might begin by imagining a spectrum. At one extreme, there exists a set of activities in "Which individuals operate free of significant group attachments, and can be described as behaving solely in an instrumentally rational manner. This is the case that mainstream econoInists have treated as universal. At the opposite extreme, there exists a set of activities in "\.Yhich individuals act solely according to the dictates of the group, and their behavior is fully explained by group membership. Heterodox economists have on occasion seen this as the universal case (for example, in some Marxist accounts "When class is said to deterITIine individual behavior). But bet"Ween these t"Wo extremes lies a variety of activities and "What is probably the great majority of types of economic behavior. This behavior is complex in involving both instrumentally rational and "principled" rational behavior in some overall structure, and developing explanations of this large range of cases seems to be a matter of explaining ho"\.Y these t"Wo fonTIs are integrated and organized "With respect to one another.3 My vie'-V is that explaining these types of cases should be the first goal of economists trying to describe individual behavior.
4. The capacity to express -w-e-intentions; sUlllIDary I close "'With a brief discussion of "'Why '-Ve should suppose that individuals are socially embedded in the sense of having a capacity to form "'Weintentions. The capacity to express "'We-intentions is a capacity to remove oneself· from one's o"'Wn particular case and circumstances, and adopt a point of vie"'W held by others. When an individual uses u"\Ve" language correctly, that individual successfully grasps ho"\V a structure of "\Ve-attitudes on the part of individuals in a group justifies that individual saying "\Vhat the group's intentions are. The closest mainstream economists corne to this sort of explanation is in their treatment of sympathy as a possible argument in the atomistic individual's o'-Vn objective function. Individuals "\Vho are sympathetic to"'Wards others are sometimes said to be "altruistic" in haVing preferences regarding others' "\VeIl-being. But this conception involves an understanding of altruism at odds "'With '-Vhat lllost people associate "'With the concept, since the "good" acts that these "altruistic" individuals engage in are only undertaken because they raise these individuals' o"'Wn utility. Most people, rather, see altruistic behavior as a kind of selfless behavior. SYITIpathy explained in this "\Vay does not really involve individuals removing themselves from their o"'Wn circumstances, or becoming selfless. It consequently does not get at '-Vhat is involved in being able to express "'We-intentions '-Vhich take individuals beyond their o"'Wn cases.
One "'Way of explaining this capacity to remove oneself from one's o"'Wn particular case and circuITIstances lies in terms of Philippe Fontaine's recent treatment of the concept of eITIpathy in early and later history of economics (Fontaine 1997; 2001) . Fontaine distinguishes bet"'Ween sylllpathy and eITIpathy, "'Where sympathy is having an o"'Wn preference regarding another's '-VeIl-being, and empathy involves imagining oneself being in the place of another. If one is empathetic to"'Wards another person, one someho"'W grasps "'What the other's situation involves (an imagined transposition of places), and then acts in one's o"'Wn capacity "'With that understanding in mind. Empathetic individuals, ho"'Wever, need not have other individuals' "'Well-being in mind '-Vhen they act. They ITIay simply register ho"'W others look at the "'World, in order to make better decisions on their 0"'Wn. 4 But empathy, in the sense of imagining another's circumstances, "'Would also aIlo"'W for altruistic behavior in the strong sense, in that one could behave sympathetically to"'Ward another having grasped "'What the other's situation involved. Thus, Fontaine distinguishes bet"'Ween imagining oneself in the place of others by intellectually appreciating their circumstances as compared to imagining oneself in the place of others by embracing their feelings and attitudes. That latter transposition could give rise to altruistic behavior vvhen one vvas sympathetic tovvard those feelings and attitudes, though of course it could also give rise to quite the opposite type of behavior vvere those feelings and attitudes not thought admirable.
Fontaine's account of hovv individuals may remove themselves from their ovvn circumstances is quite like the capacity Tuomela and others interested in collective intentionality attribute to individuals vvho have vve-intentions. There is a difference, hovvever. Fontaine's transposition of places involves an individual imagining the situation of another individual. But the capacity to fonn vve-intentions is ITlore abstract than this. When individuals successfully express vve-intentions, they grasp hovv a reciprocal use of U vve" language, backed up by a mutual belief condition across ITlany individuals, entitles theITl to say vvhat a group's intentions are. Thus, the business of reITloving oneself from one's ovvn circuITlstances is less a ITlatter of seeing things from SOITleone else's point of vievv, and rather more a matter of grasping hovv a structure of vve-intentions emerges across ITlany individuals. Nonetheless, there is a clear point of contact betvveen the tvvo conceptions. While collective intentionality analysis attributes a capacity to individuals to grasp a structure of vveintentions vvithin a group, being able to do this could be argued to presuppose that individuals are able to place themselves in the shoes of one individual after another in a group to produce that sense of vvhat the structure of vve-intentions in the group is. That is, individuals arguably engage in a saITlpling of other's vievvs, removing themselves froITl their ovvn individual circumstances in doing so, as they develop an understanding of the correct use of U vve" language in the group. Fontaine's individual-to-individual transposition of places analysis, then, might be thought to underlie collective intentionality's assumption of a capacity on the part of individuals to form vve-intentions.
To summarize, vvhat the discussion in this paper atteITlpts to do is provide an account of individuals as socially embedded so as to be able to explain hovv individuals influence the developITlent and evolution of institutions and social values. Individuals are characterized as being socially embedded vvhen they are members of groups in vvhich u vve" language is used. Collective intentionality analysis, as recently developed in philosophy, is employed to explain individuals' use of U vve " language, and then this conception of the socially embedded economic agent is introduced into agency-structure thinking about hovv individuals and institutions/ social values influence one another. A key implication of the discussion is that individual behavior cannot he understood solely in instrumentally rational terms, but needs to be enlarged and ITlodified to accommodate individuals' deontologically rational or "principled" rational behavior in groups. Whether or not such behavior actually occurs, and thus ~hether individuals can indeed be characterized as socially eInbedded, ultiInately depends on ~hether one believes individuals can forIn ~e-intentions in the sense explained here. That they do have this capacity is suggested by the idea that individuals can iInagine and place the In selves in one another's places.
Notes
1 The analytic conception follo'Ws an earlier continental philosophy understanding of intentionality that began 'With the 'Work of Franz Brentano, and 'Was further developed in the phenomenological 'Work of Edrnund HusserI. My focus on the literature from analytic philosophy is rnotivated by this tradition's emphasis on the conditions of individuality. 2 Tuomela dravvs on an account of rnutual belief that has becorne fairly standard arnong philosophers vvhich relies on the idea of a hierarchical set of beliefs iterated across individuals (Tuornela 1995: 41ff) . See Le'Wis (1969: 52ff) for a parallel account in terrns of comrnon kno'Wledge that has played a role in game theory. 3 For one exarnple of hovv such an explanation rnight be produced, see Minkler (1999) , 'Where a "cornmitment function" is added to a standard utility function representation of individual behavior. The individual is said to engage in a tvvostep iterative procedure 'With the first step corresponding to a response to group requirernents and the second step corresponding to an instrurnentally rational maxirnization of utility. 4 I use this understanding of empathy in rny discussion of Keynes's treatment of investrnent in the stock rnarket as like a ne'Wspaper beauty contest (Davis 1994: 130ff) .
